The study also revealed two interesting, incidental findings. First, the diversity of Supreme Court opinions is surprisingly great. At the extremes, one case in the 1984 Term has only been cited a single time by a later federal appellate court, while another case has garnered over 1100 federal appellate citations. Second, opinions seem to have two dimensions of significance, which are only loosely related. The amount of attention an opinion receives from lower federal courts has only a modest correlation with the attention it receives in law reviews. Thus, an academic's impression of the "typical" Supreme Court opinion would be quite different from that of a judge or lawyer. To the extent we construct our explanatory theories based on some intuitive sense of typicality, we may be led astray. 9 The choice of these terms and other methodological issues are discussed in Part II(A). 10 These models are discussed in more detail in Part I(B). 14 See Part III(B) for a discussion of the typicality question.
In this paper, using citation data for the Supreme Court's 1984 and 1990 Terms, I examine three models of the dynamics of interpretation.
9 Under the first model, the extent of an opinion's contribution to the law (and thereby its influence) is determined by a host of independent factors. These factors might include the subject matter, the parties' shaping of the issue, the identity of the Justice drafting the opinion, the amount of time since the statute was passed, the ideological salience of the issue, and so forth. This model produces a bell-shaped distribution of "step lengths," ranging from baby to giant steps. Under the second model, judges have bounded rationality and strong attachments to existing rules, leading them to take "baby steps" most of the time but occasional "giant steps" when continued adherence to an existing norm proves untenable. In empirical studies by various social scientists, this kind of model has been found to produce frequency distributions that are roughly normal but have a characteristic known as "leptokurtosis." This model may well be what Eskridge had in mind; in any event, it was my own prediction about the data. The third model stems from complexity theory (also known as chaos theory or fractal geometry.) This type of model applies to many dynamic processes-for example, it fits the frequency distribution of earthquakes. The most important implication of this model is known as scaling: the same patterns reproduce themselves in a characteristic way (though with increased magnification) at every level of magnitude. 10 Because earthquakes provide such a vivid analogy to legal change, I will refer to this as the tectonic model.
The central findings can be simply stated. The data is sharply at odds with the first model. The citation frequencies are nowhere close to the normal distribution. The data does display leptokurtosis, the statistical attribute associated with the second model. Unlike the leading studies of bounded rationality, however, my data showed extreme deviations from normality, suggesting that something more than sticky norms or bounded rationality may be involved. The third model (tectonic statutory interpretation) provides a good statistical fit for the data. Thus, although this study fall far short of "proving" its validity, the tectonic model seems to be the best working hypothesis.
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Along the way, I find that the idea of a "typical" interpretation case is problematic for three reasons. First, the diversity of Supreme Court rulings is surprisingly great. At the extremes, one case in the 1984 Term 12 has only been cited a single time by a later federal appeals court, while another case 13 garnered over eleven hundred federal appellate citations. Second, opinions seem to have two, largely unrelated, types of significance. The amount of attention an opinion receives from lower federal courts has only a limited correlation with the attention it receives in law reviews. Thus, an academic's impression of the "typical" opinion would be quite different from that of a judge or lawyer. Third, averages are relatively meaningless because the distributions have such long tails. Thus, at least if we judge by citation impact, speaking of the "typical" interpretation case is somewhat like speaking of the "typical" nation state, given the huge variations among nations on various different dimensions such as per capita income and population. 14 A brief roadmap: The first section of the paper will lay the groundwork by attempting to justify the use of citation frequencies as a measure and by laying out more carefully the three models. The second section describes the methodology and presents the empirical data, including both quantitative analysis and some qualitative assessments. The final section presents conclusions and suggestions for further research.
I. BACKGROUND
This article is not the first, nor hopefully the last, empirical study of the dynamics of statutory interpretation. This section begins with a brief discussion of previous studies and my reasons for adopting a different approach. It then explains the three models and their varying predictions.
A. Investigating the Dynamics of Interpretation
Although the normative dimension of statutory interpretation has received the most attention, there have been some important empirical studies. These studies share a common technique. They focus on judicial methodology and examine the various sources of authority cited in judicial opinions. In a nutshell, the general conclusions seem to be that courts rely on a range of authority, use an eclectic set of techniques, and vary somewhat over time in the use of specific sources such as legislative history.
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This is invaluable information, but it has its limits. First, it essentially tells us what courts say about their decision making, rather than what they do. Presumably, the two are not unrelated, but we cannot be sure how strongly they are connected. Second, although these studies suggest that courts are often dynamic in the sense of consulting nonoriginalist sources, they reveal nothing about the magnitude of dynamism. Courts might exhibit a very sleepy form of dynamism, in which courts use nonoriginalist material only to justify tiny incremental steps toward changing the law "one case at a time." These studies cannot tell us whether statutory interpretation moves by glacial evolution, fiery revolutions, or some combination of the two. Just how dynamic is "dynamic," in this setting?
Although undoubtedly an imperfect indicator, citation frequency can help us get a handle on these questions about the pace of change. Clearly, the number of citations that an opinion receives could be influenced by extraneous factors. In general, however, citation impact does seem like a plausible measure of the significance of an opinion-that is to say, of how far it "moves" the law. An opinion that contributes little new information about the law will not be very useful to later courts nor will it usually be of much interest to commentators. Thus, citation frequency is at least a rough measure of how significantly an opinion changes the law.
Although citation studies are a burgeoning area of scholarship, most studies by academics have (perhaps not surprisingly) focused on citations of academic works, often with the purpose of discovering what professor is the "fairest of them all." A smaller body of work has investigated citations of cases. One focus has been on the "ageing" of judicial authority; these studies have shown that judicial opinions generally have limited half-lives. 16 Another focus has been on determining which judges are the most influential. 17 Apparently, only one article (which is discussed in detail later) has attempted to use citation frequencies as a gauge of the dynamics of the legal process. In addition, unlike many other kinds of empirical data that might be of interest, citation frequencies are readily available using current on-line search techniques. It is an old joke that social science research resembles a drunk looking for his keys under a light post simply because he can see better there, but there is something to the joke. An imperfect but readily available source of information has a genuine edge over a more ideal but practically inaccessible source. At least, this ready availability is a good enough reason to collect the data in the hopes of finding interesting patterns. In this instance, at least, it turns out that the patterns are indeed there to be found-or in other words, that at least some of the keys actually have fallen under the street light.
As a recent study of judicial influence explains, citations "are at best a crude and rough proxy for measuring influence."
19 Several of the defects discussed in that study are relevant here. "Super" precedents might be undercounted if they settle the law so effectively that no further cases are brought (or at least appealed). Correspondingly, an ambiguous precedent might be overcounted because lower courts are unsure of when it is relevant or what it means. Judges may also use overkill in citations, piling on multiple citations for the same basic point. 20 In addition to these defects, citation frequency will underestimate the boldness of some judicial interpretations if the statute is amended or repealed, thereby eliminating the decision's relevance. To some extent, these defects can be countered by considering citations in law reviews as well as in cases: academics are likely to devote considerable attention to "super" precedents, are less prone to string citations, and would probably be interested in a Supreme Court decision that was connected with a statutory amendment. Overall, despite their possible defects, citation frequencies are our best available index of the significance of opinions.
B. Three Models
We cannot know in advance whether any significant patterns will exist in the data; nor can we ever be positive, if we find such patterns, that we have correctly identified their causes. Before examining the data, however, it is helpful to have some idea of the possibilities. This section considers three plausible models and discusses the kind of statistical distribution associated with each one.
Model One: A Random Walk through the U.S. Reports
One obvious possibility is that citation frequencies are more or less random-that is, that they are the product of unrelated factors operating in different directions, which happen to balance out one way or another in a particular case. This model could be tied to the view that the Court typically aims for a particular level of "narrow and shallow" opinions. 21 Among the possible factors influencing citation counts might be the specific statutory language involved in the case, the quality of the briefing, the frequency of litigation in the area, the identity of the opinion's author, the presence of dissent, subsequent legislative or administrative actions, the clarity of the opinion, the economic impact of the decision, and so forth.
Trying to identify and measure these various factors would be difficult. But, it turns out, we may be able to identify this kind of randomness without specifying the causal links. A basic theorem of mathematical statistics links this form of randomness with the famous bell-shaped, normal distribution. More precisely, the central limit theorem states that "the sum of a large number of independent random variables will be approximately normally distributed almost regardless of their individual distributions; any random variable which can be regarded as the sum of a large number of small, independent contributions is thus likely to follow the normal distribution approximately." We could not expect an exact correspondence between citation data and the normal distribution, if only because the normal distribution requires an infinite domain in both directions while the number of citations to an opinion cannot be a negative number. In assessing deviations from normality, a few parameters are especially useful. For later reference, here is a list:
Central Tendency
The mean, the median, and the mode of a normal distribution are the same.
Skew
A normal curve is symmetrical rather than being skewed in either direction. Symmetry is measured by the skew parameter, which is zero for the normal distribution.
Kurtosis
Kurtosis measures whether a curve is flattened out or unusually peaked, compared with the normal distribution. Kurtosis for the normal distribution is sometimes given as 3. 23 However, my software used a different formula, for which the normal distribution comes out at zero.
We will examine later whether the frequency distribution for citation counts has these characteristics. Note that in this model, as with traits like as human height and weight, there is a clearly defined "typical case" and a continuum of increasingly rare deviations from the norm. Thus, although an NBA player might be unusually tall, it probably would make little sense to say that his height "ruptured" our size expectations.
Model Two: Sticky Norms and Paradigm Shifts
Speaking of ruptures makes more sense in terms of the second model. In this model, for a variety of possible reasons, judicial behavior is "sticky." Judges are reluctant to deviate from existing norms, perhaps due to a belief in judicial restraint, and hence are nearly always prone to take only "baby steps." It is difficult to move them far away from the status quo. When the status quo finally does become untenable, however, they are likely to flip to a new equilibrium well removed from the existing one. Thus, behavior is characterized by long bouts of "normal science" punctuated by occasional "paradigm shifts." Compared with a normal distribution, mid-range changes are disfavored-usually only small changes will occur, but large changes will also be overrepresented compared with the normal curve. 24 This kind of decisionmaking is closely associated with bounded human rationality, which leads individuals to use heuristics and rules of thumb that distort their responses to new information. 25 There are several reasons to expect this model to apply to statutory interpretation opinions. First, judges are presumably as much prone to bounded rationality as the rest of us. Thus, it would be surprising if their behavior did not show some signs of stickiness due to the use of heuristics, sticky norms, or "herding" effects. Second, since Supreme Court Justices face little penalty for errors, they may be under less pressure than other actors to conform their behavior to the theoretical standard of rational conduct. Third, studies have shown significant evidence of this kind of behavior in a variety of contexts, including stock market purchases, congressional budgeting decisions, and partisan voting margins. Like the random walk model, this model is associated with a characteristic statistical property: leptokurtosis. In other words, we expect sharper peaks and fatter tails than the bell curve. 27 On the software used in this paper, any distribution with a kurtosis greater than zero is classified as leptokurtic. Bryan Jones, a political scientist who has studied bounded rationality models, explains the implications of this statistical property:
Leptokurtosis in output data has an important implication for decisionmaking. Change data from human institutions have, in comparison to the Gaussian [normal] distribution, an excess of cases in the central peak, an excess of cases in the tails of the distribution, but a paucity of cases in the "shoulders," the area between the central peak and the tails. The general substantive interpretation of these results is that change in human institutions tends to be quite conservative-most cases clustered around a central peak-but is subject to occasional quite large punctuation (the tails). On the other hand, moderate change, as represented in the shoulders of the distribution, seem underrepresented-at least in comparison with the Gaussian. It would seem that a hypothetical decision maker would have to be prepared either for virtually no change or a very large change-he or she could not hope for moderate adjustments to changing circumstances. 28 On the other hand, the scale of these effects should not be exaggerated, according to Jones. Distributions tend not to be greatly removed from the normal, so that political and economic institutions "are not wildly out of line with what theories of adaptive behavior predict" while still leaving room for "bounded rationality 'showing through.'" The third model is developed in an innovative study of judicial citations by David Post and Michael Eisen. 30 They speculate that law may have the same branching properties that generate certain fractal geometric objects, because each legal issue can potentially sprout sub-issues, which in turn can sprout subsub-issues, etc. 31 They explain how such fractal branching is associated with power law distributions, in which frequency varies as some power n of a basic parameter. Such distributions are "produced on the boundary between order and disorder, at the 'edge of chaos.'" 32 Power law distributions are "well night ubiquitous in a wide variety of physical, biological, and social systems." 33 They cite examples involving meteorology, demographics, biodiversity, and medicine-as well as the example I have chosen as emblematic, earthquake sizes. 34 Based on a very large sample of New York Court of Appeals cases and another sample of Seventh Circuit decisions, they find a good fit with their hypothesized power law (especially for the New York data). 35 The earthquake example is especially evocative. Just as tectonic plates encounter frictions and develop stresses, which are then resolved by earthquakes, so the fabric of the law can easily be imagined as developing similar stresses and strains. Indeed, the fact that most of the Supreme Court's statutory cases 36 Id. at 551, 559, 569. involve conflicts between the circuits suggests a collision between opposing principles or rules of law, which the Court must then somehow resolve.
Like the bounded rationality model, the tectonic model predicts a more sharply peaked distribution than the normal curve. It differs from the bounded rationality model in two significant respects. First, we do not expect to find anything even distantly resembling a bell-shaped curve. Second, power laws have a crucial quality known as scaling. As Post and Essen explain, fractal objects (which exemplify power laws) have no natural scale-any one section has the same structure (on a smaller scale) as the whole. "No matter how high the magnification, no matter how deep into the structure you look, it always looks exactly, dizzingly, the same."
36 More specifically, this means that there is no qualitative distinction between "normal science" and "paradigm shifting" except magnitude, just as the mechanisms and form of a small trembler are the same as those of a major earthquake except for the degree of violence. When geologists do seismic studies, they observe many small earthquakes and a few major earthquakes. But this is not because of any fundamental difference between "normal" and "paradigm-shifting" seismic events. We would find exactly the same pattern if we distinguished between tiny and merely small seismic events, or between large and gargantuan ones. Thus, in this model, paradigm shifts are just normal science "writ large." Similarly, after shocks are not distinguishable from other earthquakes the spacing between quakes follows the same law whether the are minutes or decades apart. 37 
II. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
The empirical research was conducted in two phases. The first, somewhat more exploratory phase, covered the 1990 Term. The analysis was quite time consuming, since I was learning to use the software, refreshing my knowledge of statistics, and experimenting with different ways to handle the data in a search for patterns. The second phrase was closer to the social science ideal, with hypotheses and tests determined in advance, and a somewhat more careful and detailed data collection. I will not burden the reader with all of my errors and false-trails in the first phase. But since one of my major purposes is to encourage others to utilize the same types of citation data, I want to be candid about how the project developed.
A. Methodology
Probably the single most important decision in the project was simply to undertake positive rather than normative research. Having made that decision, I was left with the question of how to investigate dynamic interpretation empirically. From examining the literature, it seemed to me that relatively little use had been made of the vast amount of data that can now be collected from sources such as Westlaw and Lexis. Bryan Jones's work then provided my initial inspiration, since it wasn't hard to put together his work with the legal literature on sticky norms and precedential cascades. My initial hypothesis, then, was that citation frequencies would look like the modified normal distributions found in his work, basically symmetrical and single-peaked but with some leptokurtosis.
The next task was to pick a sample of cases. If two cases are from different years, their citation counts cannot be directly compared. (The earlier case has had more time to accumulate citations than the later one; on the other hand, its greatest impact may have been at a time when there was less litigation and therefore fewer opportunities to be cited.) To avoid this problem, I decided to focus on a single year. I wanted a year that was early enough so that cases would have ample opportunity to accumulate citations, because I was worried that otherwise most of the citations would be crammed down near zero, exaggerating the skew. On the other hand, I wanted a year that was reasonably representative of the modern interpretative regime, rather 38 Both categories of cases are unlike the normal Supreme Court opinion. Cases in the original jurisdiction usually involve interstate boundary disputes. Their relevance to other courts is limited. Per curiam opinions generally involve issues that the Court believes are too clear-cut or limited in relevance to warrant oral argument or a full-scale opinion by the Court. They are not intended to establish "new law." 39 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991). Out of curiosity, I later did a citation count for this case. As it turned out, Coleman had a very large number of citations (3985). 40 The search was conducted on February 2, 2002. To allow replication despite the lack of a rigorous coding process, the complete list of cases and citation counts can be found in Appendix A. than reflecting some earlier world such as the Warren Court. With these considerations in mind, I semirandomly chose the 1990 Term.
The next step was to sit down with volume 111 of the West Supreme Court Reporter and decide which cases to include. My basic rule was to include any case that was not entirely constitutional or common law, so that textual interpretation was involved. (Note that I included cases involving interpretation of the federal procedural or evidentiary rules.) I also eliminated a few cases that involved the interpretation of federal statutes but had begun in state court, on the thought that an issue arising in state court might naturally get additional citations just because there are so many more state than federal decisions. In addition, I excluded per curiam opinions and cases falling within the Court's original jurisdiction. 38 In most cases, the inclusion decision was easy to make, but there were a few tough calls. The most notable was Coleman v. Thompson, 39 a habeas ruling which mentions the applicable federal statute but appears to be almost entirely based on a common law theory of equitable discretion. Because the statute seemed so incidental to the decision, I ultimately excluded it from the data set.
I then set about collecting the citation numbers. 40 This proved to be much easier than I expected, because West's KeyCite feature not only presents citations broken down in different ways but also automatically generates citation counts in the various categories. As I began collecting the data, I almost immediately noticed that the numbers seemed to be quite scattered, with little apparent clustering around a central value. After I had finished gathering the total number of cites, I began to wonder whether combining citations from different sources was affecting the results, so I went back and got a separate count on case citations. The bulk of the non-case citations were from law reviews, but I did not tabulate them separately in this phase of the study. I then set about analyzing the data, first finding averages, means, kurtosis and skew figures. I then constructed frequency distributions and looked at various permutations such as log and semi-log graphs. Finally, I experimented with fitting other curves to the data, such as exponential or Poisson distributions, using regression analysis to test the goodness of fit. 41 This statistical analysis was done with a simple spreadsheet program (QuattroPro), of the kind commonly packaged with word processing programs.
In looking at the figures on case versus total citations, I was surprised that some of the cases which were most familiar to me, such as Johnson Controls, had very few citations in later opinions compared to the number of non-case (primarily law review) citations. I then set about calculating the ratio of case to non-case citations. Then I ran a regression of the number of case versus noncase citations for each opinion. Finally, to get a better feel for what was going on, I examined fifteen opinions more carefully. I took the ten opinions with the highest number of citations, and divided them into two groups (predominantly case versus predominantly non-case citations). For comparison purposes, I also read the five cases closest to the median number of total citations.
With what I had learned from this first phase, I then set about phase II. This time, I instructed my research assistant to chose a year between 1982 and 1995 at random (excluding 1990), which he did by drawing a slip of paper out of a hat. 45 Recall that the formula used by this software makes zero the kurtosis of the normal curve.
classified the cases as either statutory or non-statutory. There were about ten cases where he was unsure and where I made the decision. I also later removed two cases he had classified as statutory but which seemed to me to be clearly constitutional. He then collected a more detailed set of data, including separate counts for state and federal citations, law reviews, page lengths, and case descriptions. 42 Having received this data, I again calculated means, medians, kurtosis and skews, set up frequency diagrams, and did log log regressions to test the third model. Thus, the second phase more or less tracked the first, except with a new data set, somewhat more care, and a greater degree of planning.
B. Findings
The two Terms were rather unlike in some ways. The composition of the Court charged, with the departure of Brennan, Burger, and Powell, and the addition of Kennedy, Scalia, and Souter. There were more cases in 1984 than 1990, in line with the recent trend toward smaller Supreme Court caseloads. 43 Moreover, there was also a difference in judicial methodology between the two Terms: the Court was only a third as likely to cite legislative history in 1990 than 1984, so that the later Term was apparently more staunchly textualist. 44 Nevertheless, the citation patterns from the two Terms were strikingly similar.
1990 Term
The data for the 1990 Term are displayed in Appendix A. As can be seen from glancing at the data, there was a large range in terms of numbers of citations per case. Considering the total citations (case and noncase), the mean was 613, but the median was only 419. The standard deviation was 222, and both the leptokurtosis (3.08) 45 and the skew (1.84) were pronounced. On average, citations were evenly divided between case and non-case cites, with a mean of 276 noncase cites. (Noncase cites included law reviews, treaties, practitioner materials, and administrative agency decisions.) But the distribution for non-case cites was even more skewed, with a median of 160, a standard deviation of 322, and high kurtosis (7.8) and skew (2.7). Readers who find these statistics unhelpful may find the charts in Figures 1 and 2 , which break out case and non-case citations, more enlightening. 46 More complete results for the regression analyses for the 1990 Term can be found in Appendix C. Using a single-tailed t test, the X coefficients are significant at the 1% level. (A two-tail test would not be appropriate because we know in advance that the Xcoefficient is not positive: otherwise there would be a far greater number of high impact than lower impact cases, which seems unlikely). For an explanation of the use of the t statistic and a useful table, see Schroeder, Sjoquist, and Stephan, supra note 41, at 46-49, 82-83.
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Figure 2
Testing for a power law requires a log log plot. 46 The regression analysis showed a close fit, with an R 2 of .83 for the non-case citations, and an almost identical R 2 for the regression with case citations. In both instances, the slope coefficient was about 1.2 and much larger than the estimate of standard error. As an inspection of the plots in Figures 3 and 4 shows, the log log plots are much "better behaved" and closer to linear than the previous charts.
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47 Although weak, the positive relationship was genuine. The X coefficient was significant at the 2.5% level.
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Figure 4
As mentioned earlier, I was intrigued by the apparent divergences between case and non-case citations. A regression showed that my impression was correct. Although an increase in the number of case citations clearly did predict a higher average number of noncase citations, almost none of the variance was explained (with an R 2 of only .07). 47 When I divided the ten most heavily cited cases into two groups, based on the proportion of judicial versus non-judicial citations, the difference between the groups was striking. Of the five cases most frequently cited by courts, all but one dealt with a procedural issue, and the exception dealt 
Number of Citations per Case
with ERISA preemption. 48 The five cases most frequently cited in law reviewers were much different.
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All but one of the cases involved discrimination law. The fifth case involved the statutory and constitutional requirement of originality in copyright law, an issue with strong implications for restrictions on speech. In short, the courts seemed most keenly interested in procedure, while the commentators were drawn to cases with quasi-constitutional overtones.
1984 Term
The shapes of the distributions in the more careful 1984 study were similar. For the total citations, the mean was 741, while the median was only 528. The standard deviation was quite large (712), and both the skew (1.8) and the leptokurtosis (2.9 on a scale with 0 for the normal curve) were pronounced. Figure 5 shows the distribution of citations in all judicial opinions. As Figure 6 shows, the log log plot is once again much better behaved.
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Figure 5
Log Log Plot --Judicial Cites 1984 Term
Figure 6
For the 1984 data, more focused counts were also tabulated. One count was for citations by federal appellate courts. Here, the mean was lower (153) but we have the familiar story in terms of kurtosis (11 in this instance) and skew (2.9). Again, the plots tell the tale. As Figures 7 and 8 show, the ordinary plot for federal appellate citations is highly skewed and curved, while the log log plot comes close to linear. 50 The regression results confirm this impression. The R 2 on the log log plot was .87, with an X coefficient of -1.8 significant at the .01 level).
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Figure 8
Rather than relying on a "non-case" count as in the 1990 analysis, Phase II included a specific breakdown for law review citations for the 1984 data. Figures 9 and 10 show the relevant distributions. The log log regression again comes out quite well, with an R 2 of .83 and an X coefficient of -1.6 (significant at the .01 level).
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Figure 10
As a check on the relationship between different forms of citation, I also ran a regression of federal court citations versus law review citations. The regression confirmed that the features of opinions that interest federal judges overlap only slightly with those that interest academics. The R 2 was only .07, meaning that virtually none of the variance was explained. The X coefficient was positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that some small overlap of interests does exist but that it is dwarfed by the other divergences.
Once again, an examination of the top five cases in each category was revealing. Of the five cases with the highest number of judicial cites, three dealt with procedural issues, one involved ERISA, and the fifth involved an erroneous jury instruction regarding municipal liability under section 1983. 51 As in 1990, the law review list contained a leading copyright case, a case on arbitration of statutory claims, and a quasiconstitutional case (on state sovereign immunity).
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The fifth case dealt with an important issue in administrative law regarding review of non-enforcement decisions. 53 In 1984, as in 1990, the only case on both lists dealt with arbitration of statutory claims.
III. IMPLICATIONS
What, if anything, does this all mean? Given the fact that only two years were studied and that the methodology was fairly crude, any conclusions have to be somewhat tentative. Nevertheless, in my view, the data does provide reasonable support for two conclusions. The first relates to the dynamics of statutory interpretation. Taken as a whole, the data seems most consistent with the tectonic model. (But since only two other models were tested, it remains possible that some other model would be superior.) The second, somewhat firmer conclusion, is that the idea of a typical statutory interpretation opinion is quite problematic. In particular, the opinions that are likely to come to a law professor's mind as typical are likely to be quite
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different from those that a judge or litigator would find typical. After discussing these conclusions, I close with a brief discussion of possible directions for further research.
A. Toward a Theory of Tectonic Statutory Interpretation
Earlier in this article, I sketched three models of the dynamics of statutory interpretation. The first of these models, the random walk model, seems clearly inconsistent with the data. The random walk model implies a normal distribution of citation frequencies. The data for both years and for all categories of citations were not at all normally distributed, as can be seen visually from inspecting the various charts and statistically from the high skew and kurtosis numbers.
The second model, the bounded rationality model, cannot be rejected quite as confidently. This model predicts leptokurtosis, and the data do indeed display leptokurtosis. But there can be too much of a good thing. The "boundedness" part of the model predicts leptokurtosis, but the "rationality" part of the model suggests that deviations from the normal distribution will not be too severe. This deviation is strikingly shown by Figure 11 (prepared with the SPSS statical software). Previous empirical support for this model have involved distribution much less skewed than I have found. On balance, despite my initial support for this model, I have concluded that it is not well-supported by the data.
Total Citations (1990) Compared with Normal Curve
This leaves the tectonic model, which performed very well. First, the high R 2 for each of the log log regressions shows that the model is a good fit, in the sense of explaining much of the variance in citation frequencies. Second, the X-coefficients for both years and for different categories of citations are strikingly similar, ranging between minus one and minus two. (Basically, in each case, the number of cases N with a given number of citations per case C is given by a formula roughly of the form, N = kC -1.5 , where k is a constant that varies for each set of citations.) Indeed, Post and Eisen obtained similar coefficients for the 54 data from the New York Court of Appeals and for their combined data set from the Seventh Circuit. 54 This suggests that the good fits are not merely happenstance, but instead reflect some underlying structural similarity between the various sets of data.
Because such a broad range of phenomena are subject to power laws of this kind, the existence of this law does not tell us much about the underlying mechanism. That mechanism might or might not take the form of the branching pattern discussed by Post and Eisen. What we do know from the existence of such a power law, however, is that whatever mechanism exists covers a wide range of scales. In other words, the same basic mechanism should generate both tremors (opinions which add little to the law and gather only a few cites) and earthquakes (opinions which greatly shift the law and gather a high number of cites).
The seismic analogy would support more serious consideration of the idea that opinions are generated by stresses and fractures in the law, which are resolved in large or small ways by shifts on one side of a fault line or the other. These shifts, in term, may generate stresses elsewhere, resulting in later seismic events involving related legal issues. It is common to speak of "shifts in the legal landscape." The tectonic model suggests that the analogy may be more exact, and that these shifts may actually resemble earthquakes in some quantitative way.
B. The Elusive "Typical" Opinion
As we saw earlier, there is a tremendous spread among citation counts. Some Supreme Court opinions have only a a few dozen cites; others have one or two thousand. The median opinion may have ten times as many cites as one kind but only a fifth as many as the other. In sum, the most typical attribute of any opinion, apparently, is to be atypical.
If we do want to single out particular opinions for study, we have to think carefully about what to look for. Taking the median opinion is probably the best we can in identifying what cases are representative of the whole set of statutory interpretation opinions. But if what interests us is not how the Court handles fairly routine cases, but how major new law gets made, these median cases may give a misleading impression. New law is disproportionately made by a dozen or so cases at the high end of the distribution, and a study of median or run-of-the-mill cases will exclude these blockbusters. If we are interested in the Court's methodology, the median cases may be more revealing; if we are interested in how statutory interpretation evolves, we might be more interested in the outliers.
Determining what cases to study is all the more difficult because case impact is not unitary. Probably the clearest finding of this study is that there are two, almost completely independent, dimensions of case impact. The characteristics that lead to citations by courts seem to be quite different from those that lead to citations by legal academics. Perhaps this should not be a surprise. We already know that courts and academics differ greatly in which secondary sources (such as law review articles) they cite. 55 But it is nonetheless striking just how little correlation there is between judicial and academic citations of Supreme Court cases.
One might view this finding as simply another confirmation of the well-known (and apparently widening) chasm between the legal academy and the profession. But it would probably be a mistake to view the split as merely reflecting an "ivory tower" temperament among professors. The cases cited most heavily by law reviews involve issues of genuine social importance, even if they are not issues that give rise to extensive litigation. In the 1990 Term, the case most heavily cited by courts involved the burden of proof in certain bankruptcy proceedings. This is an issue that is apparently important to bankruptcy judges and practitioners, as well as to a large numbers of people who are either bankruptcy petitioners or their creditors. But in some sense, it does not have the same fundamental social significance as the discrimination cases that had the lion's share of the attention in the law reviews. We should resist the temptation to dismiss the judicial citation figures as merely indicating the limited intellectually perspective of the profession or the law review citation figures as merely indicating distance from the real world of legal practice. Instead, we should view them as reflecting independent but equally significant dimensions of legal impact.
Academics who write about statutory interpretation probably need to be particularly careful, because their own ideas of typicality are likely to reflect one of these dimensions much more than the other. Thus, in selecting individual cases for analysis, it is important to consider opinions which dramatically impact litigation and practice, as well as those that dramatically relate to important social issues. A useful convention might be to routinely report both judicial and law review citation figures whenever discussing a specific statutory interpretation opinion, or at least the ratio between the two.
C. Future Directions for Research
It is much easier to generate new ideas for empirical research than to actually carry them out. With that caveat in mind, here are three ideas for extending the line of research presented in this paper.
The first is simply to solidify the methodology used in this paper. The methods could be made more rigorous by developing a more formal procedure for coding cases as statutory or nonstatutory. Moreover, it would be possible, though time-consuming, to use KeyCite to distinguish between citations to the statutory and nonstatutory holdings of the same opinion. Also, two years is not really enough. Using a larger number of years would provide greater confidence about the results. Perhaps more importantly, it should be possible to test some alternative models against the tectonic model, which again would provide a greater level of confidence about the conclusions. And of course, the level of statistical sophistication could well be increased.
The second idea for further research would be to expand the analysis to include various characteristics of each opinion. It would be useful to know whether a particular Justice's work has greater impact on lower courts or on academics. It would also be useful to categorize the cases (for example, as procedural or substantive). Perhaps most intriguing, the citation impact analysis could be combined with previous work on the sources of authority in judicial opinions. Holding other variables constant, it would certainly be interesting to know whether textualist opinions tend to have greater or lesser impact than opinions relying on legislative history.
Third, longitudinal extensions of the study would shed more light on the mechanisms involved in citation impact. Cases may differ from each other primarily in their amount of immediate impact or in their staying power. Moreover, by examining cases which actually discuss rather than merely cite the opinion (another useful feature of KeyCite), one could probably get a better grip on the extent to which cases are cited because the holdings raise new issues as opposed to settling old ones. It would also be interesting to connect the citation information with the age of the statutory provision. Dynamic interpretation, in the sense of updating old statutes, might show up fairly clearly in the form of high impact opinions involving old statutes. It would certainly be useful to get some sense of how common such opinions really are and when they arise. It would also be useful to determine whether these cases arose because changing social or economic conditions have produced new types of litigation; because changing social values made old rules seem inappropriate; or because of changes in the legal landscape.
In addition to these possible directions for formal empirical research, this paper also has some implications for the kinds of informal case studies that are more common among law professors. As we have seen, the idea of typicality seems to be quite problematic in this area, and legal scholars need to be sensitive to the issue of case selection. Scholars also probably need to make a special effort to include cases with high levels of judicial citations, even if those opinions are not on issues that legal academics consider "sexy." 56 As Stephen Ross points out in his contribution to this symposium, Eskridge's article also illustrates a related phenomenon. It has been extensively cited by other scholars but rarely by courts. Again, this may be a sign of the academic/professional split, or it may indicate that the average judge is interested in a different set of opinions than those upon which Eskridge focuses.
On the theoretical side, the tectonic model seems to be a potentially useful addition to existing visions of statutory interpretation, many of which can ultimately be traced back to Bill Eskridge's work. 56 Viewing appellate opinions as seismic events-large or small legal shifts that resolve stresses between conflicting legal forces while sometimes creating new stresses-may prove to be a fruitful perspective. If nothing else, it is a good reminder to expect the unexpected. If this model is correct, every now and then, just as with earthquakes, we can expect to run into legal shifts of extraordinary magnitude, far out of line with past yearto-year experience. The model suggests that these mega-cases are extraordinary in their impact, but not in the mechanisms that produce them. Much of legal scholarship is in essence a search for fruitful metaphors. The earthquake metaphor may turn out to be not only striking but quantitatively valid.
Quite regardless of the ultimate validity of the conclusions reached in this paper, citation impact figures are a valuable and largely untapped source of information about the dynamics of statutory interpretation, which cry out for further investigation. They could also help identify which individual cases are worth indepth study.
